Game Theory & Strategic Interactions [Econ 013]

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The Game Theory and Strategic Interactions [ECON 013] Course for BA (Hons) Economics Semester V, Delhi University has been taught by Mr. Dheeraj Suri. The Video Lectures are based upon the books prescribed by the University of Delhi. The Duration of Video Lectures is approximately 55 Hours.

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Demo Lectures for Game Theory & Strategic Interactions

Course Introduction

Game Theory Introduction

Game Theory Introduction Lecture 1
Game Theory Introduction Lecture 2

Chapter 1 : Nash Equilibrium

Prisoner’s Dilemma, Osborne Ch. 2
Prisoner’s Dilemma Examples, Osborne Ch. 2
Altruistic Preferences, Osborne Ch. 2
Bach or Stravinsky, Osborne Ch. 2
Games with Conflict, Osborne Ch. 2

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Demo Quiz

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Game Theory Test #1

1. Please Read the Questions and all the options Carefully, Before Selecting Your Choice.
2. You are not Allowed to edit your answers after submission.
3. The Paper has ten Questions
4. Time Allowed is 10 Minutes.
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1 / 10

Consider the Game

               L          M         R

U        2, 0      3, 3     0, 0

M        1, -1     0, 0     1, 0

D        4, -4     2, 2     1, 1

where the row's player's payoff is given first, followed by the column player's payoff. which of the following statement's is false

2 / 10

Sania and Saina are bargaining over how to split 10 Rupees. Both claimants simultaneously name shares they would like to have, s1 and s2, where 0 ≤ s1, s2 ≤ 10. If s1 + s2 ≤ 10 then the claimants receive the shares they named; otherwise both receive zero. Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game

3 / 10

Suppose three players, 1, 2 and 3, use the following procedure to allocate 9 indivisible coins. Player 1 proposes an allocation (x1, x2, x3) where xi is the number of coins given to player i. Players 2 and 3 vote on the proposal, saying either Y (Yes) or N (No). If there are two Y votes, then the proposed allocation is implemented. If there are two N votes, the proposal is rejected. If there is one Y vote  and one N vote, then player 1 gets to vote Y or N. Now, the proposal is accepted if there are two Y votes and rejected if there are two N votes.
If 1’s proposal is rejected, then 2 makes a proposal. Now, only 3 votes Y or N. If 3 votes Y, then 2’s proposal is accepted. If 3 votes N, then the proposal is rejected and the allocation (3, 3, 3) is  implemented.
Assume that, if the expected allocation to be received by a particular player by voting Y or N is identical, then the player votes N.

If 1’s proposal is rejected and 2 gets to make a proposal, her proposal will be

4 / 10

Consider the following game:

             L                  R

T        (x, x)        (b, y)

B        (y, b)        (a, a)

Which of the following statements is true when y > x > a > b?

5 / 10

Consider the following game. Player 1 moves first and chooses L or R. If she plays R, the game ends and the payoffs are (10, 0). If she plays L, then player 2 moves and chooses either L or R. If he plays R, the game ends and the payoffs are (0, 20). If he plays L, then player 1 moves and chooses L or R. The game ends in both cases. If player 1 chooses L, then the payoffs are (30, 30). If she plays R, then the payoffs are (40, 0). This game

6 / 10

Firm 1 is the potential entrant into a market in which Firm 2 is the incumbent monopolist. Firm 1 moves first and chooses to "Enter" or "Not Enter". If it does "not enter", then Firm 1 gets profit 0 and Firm 2 gets the monopoly profit 10. If Firm 1 "Enters", then Firm 2 chooses to "Fight" or "Not Fight". If Firm 2 "fights" the Firm 1's profit is -2 and Firm 2's profit is 6. If Firm 2 does "not fight", then Firm 1's profit is 2 and Firm 2's profit is 8. Firm 2's strategy of "Fight" can be best interpreted as 

7 / 10

Consider the game

 

U          x, x          z, y

D          y, z          y, y

where the row player's payoff is given first, followed by the column player's payoff. This game has only one Nash equilibrium when

8 / 10

Consider the following game with players 1 and 2; payoffs are denoted by (a, b) where a is 1’s payoff and b is 2’s payoff. First, player 1 chooses either U or D. If she plays D, then the game ends and the payoff are (1, 0). If she plays U, then player 2 chooses either U or D. If he plays D, then the game ends and the payoffs are (0, 2). If he plays U, then player 1 again chooses either U or D. The game ends in both cases. If player 1 chooses D, then the payoffs are (4, 0). If player 1 chooses U, then the payoffs are (3, 3). 

9 / 10

Consider the following two games

Game 1:                                                         Game 2 :

                                Hawk                                                                 Hawk           Dove

Enter                    (-1, 1)                               Enter                        (-1, 1)            (3, 3)

Not Enter           (0, 6)                                Not Enter               (0, 6)             (0, 7)

In every Payoff pair "x, y", x is the payoff of row player and y is the payoff of column player. Analyse these games. These games illustrate that , in a strategic situation

10 / 10

Suppose three players, 1, 2 and 3, use the following procedure to allocate 9 indivisible coins. Player 1 proposes an allocation (x1, x2, x3) where xi is the number of coins given to player i. Players 2 and 3 vote on the proposal, saying either Y (Yes) or N (No). If there are two Y votes, then the proposed allocation is implemented. If there are two N votes, the proposal is rejected. If there is one Y vote  and one N vote, then player 1 gets to vote Y or N. Now, the proposal is accepted if there are two Y votes and rejected if there are two N votes.
If 1’s proposal is rejected, then 2 makes a proposal. Now, only 3 votes Y or N. If 3 votes Y, then 2’s proposal is accepted. If 3 votes N, then the proposal is rejected and the allocation (3, 3, 3) is  implemented.
Assume that, if the expected allocation to be received by a particular player by voting Y or N is identical, then the player votes N.

1’s proposal will be

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Chapter-2-Mixed-Strategy

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Exam Pattern for Game Theory & Strategic Interactions

The Question Paper will be of 90 Marks

►All units carry equal weightage

►Internal Assessment 30 Marks

►Continuous Assessment 40 Marks

Recommended Readings

Osborne, M. (2004) : An Introduction to Game Theory (Indian Edition)

Watson, J. (2013): Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory, 3rd edition

Course Content of our Video Lectures

Lectures are Strictly as per Latest Syllabus for UGCF 2024

Chapter 0 : Game Theory Introduction

Number Video Lectures : 2

Duration of Video Lectures : 90 Minutes

Topics Covered

Game Theory Introduction,

Key Terminologies ,

Types of Games,

Representation of Games,

Nash Equilibrium,

Unit I : Complete Information Simultaneous Move Game

Chapter 1 : Nash Equilibria

Number Video Lectures : 4

Duration of Video Lectures : 60 Minutes

Based Upon Chapter 2 Osborne

Topics Covered

Strategic Games,

Examples : Prisoner’s Dilemma, Bach or Stravinsky, Matching Pennies, The Stag Hunt ,

Nash Equilibrium,

Best Response Functions,

Dominated Actions,

Chapter 2 : Mixed Strategies

Number Video Lectures : 2

Duration of Video Lectures : 60 Minutes

Based Upon Chapter 4 & Chapter 11 Watson

Topics Covered

Notion of Mixed Strategy,

Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium ,

Duopoly with Capacity Constraints,

Unit II : Complete Information Extensive Form Game

Chapter 3 : Extensive Games with Perfect Information

Number Video Lectures : 4

Duration of Video Lectures : 60 Minutes

Based Upon Chapter 5 Osborne

Topics Covered

Extensive Games with Perfect Information,

Entry Game, Backward Induction Method,

Strategies & Outcomes,

Nash Equilibrium of Extensive Game with Perfect Information,

Subgame Perfect Equilibrium,

Dominated Actions,

Unit III : Topics from Industrial Organization

Chapter 4 : Nash Equilibrium Illustrations

Number Video Lectures : 4

Duration of Video Lectures : 60 Minutes

Based Upon Chapter 3 & Chapter 6 Osborne

Topics Covered

Meaning of Oligopoly & Duopoly,

Cournot’s Model of Oligopoly,

Bertrand Model of Oligopoly,

Electoral Competition, Hotelling’s Model of Electoral Competition,

Auctions,

The Ultimatum Game,

Stackelberg’s Model of Duopoly,

Unit IV : Incomplete Information

Chapter 5 : Random Events & Incomplete Information

Number Video Lectures : 2

Duration of Video Lectures : 60 Minutes

Based Upon Chapter 24 Watson

Topics Covered

Random Events,

A Game of Incomplete Information ,

Extensive Form & Normal Form Representations,

Chapter 6 : Risk and Incentives

Number Video Lectures : 2

Duration of Video Lectures : 60 Minutes

Based Upon Chapter 25 Watson

Topics Covered

Risk Aversion,

Utility Function & Risk Premium,

Arrow Pratt Measure of Relative Risk Aversion,

A Principal-Agent Game,

Chapter 7 : Bayesian Rationalizability

Number Video Lectures : 2

Duration of Video Lectures : 60 Minutes

Based Upon Chapter 26 Watson

Topics Covered

Bayesian Nash Equilibrium,

Bayesian Ratinalizability,

Chapter 8 : Lemons, Auctions & Information Aggregation

Number Video Lectures : 2

Duration of Video Lectures : 60 Minutes

Based Upon Chapter 27 Watson

Topics Covered

Markets and Lemons,

Auctions,

Unit V : Communicating Information

Chapter 9 : Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

Number Video Lectures : 2

Duration of Video Lectures : 60 Minutes

Based Upon Chapter 28 Watson

Topics Covered

Conditional Beliefs about Types,

Sequantial Rationality,

Consistency of Beliefs,

Chapter 10 : Job Market Signalling & Reputation

Number Video Lectures : 2

Duration of Video Lectures : 60 Minutes

Based Upon Chapter 29 Watson

Topics Covered

Jobs & School,

Perfect Bayseian Equilibrium,

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Economics (H) Semester V [ UGCF 2024 ]

Video Lectures, PDF Notes, Mock Tests & Live Doubt Sessions are offered for the following Subjects for BA (Hons) Economics Semester V, Delhi University

Theory of Public Finance (ECON 061)

Money & Banking (ECON 062)

Introduction to Comparative Economic Development (ECON 064)

Principles of Microeconomics – II (ECON 027)

Corporate Finance, Governance & Development (ECON 067)