Firm 1 is the potential entrant into a market in which Firm 2 is the incumbent monopolist. Firm 1 moves first and chooses to "Enter" or "Not Enter". If it does "not enter", then Firm 1 gets profit 0 and Firm 2 gets the monopoly profit 10. If Firm 1 "Enters", then Firm 2 chooses to "Fight" or "Not Fight". If Firm 2 "fights" the Firm 1's profit is -2 and Firm 2's profit is 6. If Firm 2 does "not fight", then Firm 1's profit is 2 and Firm 2's profit is 8. Firm 2's strategy of "Fight" can be best interpreted as 

Consider the Game

               L          M         R

U        2, 0      3, 3     0, 0

M        1, -1     0, 0     1, 0

D        4, -4     2, 2     1, 1

where the row's player's payoff is given first, followed by the column player's payoff. which of the following statement's is false

Consider the following game:

             L                  R

T        (x, x)        (b, y)

B        (y, b)        (a, a)

Which of the following statements is true when y > x > a > b?

Consider the following two games

Game 1:                                                         Game 2 :

                                Hawk                                                                 Hawk           Dove

Enter                    (-1, 1)                               Enter                        (-1, 1)            (3, 3)

Not Enter           (0, 6)                                Not Enter               (0, 6)             (0, 7)

In every Payoff pair "x, y", x is the payoff of row player and y is the payoff of column player. Analyse these games. These games illustrate that , in a strategic situation

Consider the game

U          x, x          z, y

D          y, z          y, y

where the row player's payoff is given first, followed by the column player's payoff. This game has only one Nash equilibrium when

Consider the following game with players 1 and 2; payoffs are denoted by (a, b) where a is 1’s payoff and b is 2’s payoff. First, player 1 chooses either U or D. If she plays D, then the game ends and the payoff are (1, 0). If she plays U, then player 2 chooses either U or D. If he plays D, then the game ends and the payoffs are (0, 2). If he plays U, then player 1 again chooses either U or D. The game ends in both cases. If player 1 chooses D, then the payoffs are (4, 0). If player 1 chooses U, then the payoffs are (3, 3). 

Consider the following game. Player 1 moves first and chooses L or R. If she plays R, the game ends and the payoffs are (10, 0). If she plays L, then player 2 moves and chooses either L or R. If he plays R, the game ends and the payoffs are (0, 20). If he plays L, then player 1 moves and chooses L or R. The game ends in both cases. If player 1 chooses L, then the payoffs are (30, 30). If she plays R, then the payoffs are (40, 0). This game

Suppose three players, 1, 2 and 3, use the following procedure to allocate 9 indivisible coins. Player 1 proposes an allocation (x1, x2, x3) where xi is the number of coins given to player i. Players 2 and 3 vote on the proposal, saying either Y (Yes) or N (No). If there are two Y votes, then the proposed allocation is implemented. If there are two N votes, the proposal is rejected. If there is one Y vote  and one N vote, then player 1 gets to vote Y or N. Now, the proposal is accepted if there are two Y votes and rejected if there are two N votes.
If 1’s proposal is rejected, then 2 makes a proposal. Now, only 3 votes Y or N. If 3 votes Y, then 2’s proposal is accepted. If 3 votes N, then the proposal is rejected and the allocation (3, 3, 3) is  implemented.
Assume that, if the expected allocation to be received by a particular player by voting Y or N is identical, then the player votes N.

1’s proposal will be

Sania and Saina are bargaining over how to split 10 Rupees. Both claimants simultaneously name shares they would like to have, s1 and s2, where 0 ≤ s1, s2 ≤ 10. If s1 + s2 ≤ 10 then the claimants receive the shares they named; otherwise both receive zero. Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game

Suppose three players, 1, 2 and 3, use the following procedure to allocate 9 indivisible coins. Player 1 proposes an allocation (x1, x2, x3) where xi is the number of coins given to player i. Players 2 and 3 vote on the proposal, saying either Y (Yes) or N (No). If there are two Y votes, then the proposed allocation is implemented. If there are two N votes, the proposal is rejected. If there is one Y vote  and one N vote, then player 1 gets to vote Y or N. Now, the proposal is accepted if there are two Y votes and rejected if there are two N votes.
If 1’s proposal is rejected, then 2 makes a proposal. Now, only 3 votes Y or N. If 3 votes Y, then 2’s proposal is accepted. If 3 votes N, then the proposal is rejected and the allocation (3, 3, 3) is  implemented.
Assume that, if the expected allocation to be received by a particular player by voting Y or N is identical, then the player votes N.

If 1’s proposal is rejected and 2 gets to make a proposal, her proposal will be