Consider the following two games

Game 1:                                                         Game 2 :

                                Hawk                                                                 Hawk           Dove

Enter                    (-1, 1)                               Enter                        (-1, 1)            (3, 3)

Not Enter           (0, 6)                                Not Enter               (0, 6)             (0, 7)

In every Payoff pair "x, y", x is the payoff of row player and y is the payoff of column player. Analyse these games. These games illustrate that , in a strategic situation

Sania and Saina are bargaining over how to split 10 Rupees. Both claimants simultaneously name shares they would like to have, s1 and s2, where 0 ≤ s1, s2 ≤ 10. If s1 + s2 ≤ 10 then the claimants receive the shares they named; otherwise both receive zero. Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game

Consider the following game:

             L                  R

T        (x, x)        (b, y)

B        (y, b)        (a, a)

Which of the following statements is true when y > x > a > b?

Consider the following game. Player 1 moves first and chooses L or R. If she plays R, the game ends and the payoffs are (10, 0). If she plays L, then player 2 moves and chooses either L or R. If he plays R, the game ends and the payoffs are (0, 20). If he plays L, then player 1 moves and chooses L or R. The game ends in both cases. If player 1 chooses L, then the payoffs are (30, 30). If she plays R, then the payoffs are (40, 0). This game

Consider the Game

               L          M         R

U        2, 0      3, 3     0, 0

M        1, -1     0, 0     1, 0

D        4, -4     2, 2     1, 1

where the row's player's payoff is given first, followed by the column player's payoff. which of the following statement's is false

Firm 1 is the potential entrant into a market in which Firm 2 is the incumbent monopolist. Firm 1 moves first and chooses to "Enter" or "Not Enter". If it does "not enter", then Firm 1 gets profit 0 and Firm 2 gets the monopoly profit 10. If Firm 1 "Enters", then Firm 2 chooses to "Fight" or "Not Fight". If Firm 2 "fights" the Firm 1's profit is -2 and Firm 2's profit is 6. If Firm 2 does "not fight", then Firm 1's profit is 2 and Firm 2's profit is 8. Firm 2's strategy of "Fight" can be best interpreted as 

Consider the following game with players 1 and 2; payoffs are denoted by (a, b) where a is 1’s payoff and b is 2’s payoff. First, player 1 chooses either U or D. If she plays D, then the game ends and the payoff are (1, 0). If she plays U, then player 2 chooses either U or D. If he plays D, then the game ends and the payoffs are (0, 2). If he plays U, then player 1 again chooses either U or D. The game ends in both cases. If player 1 chooses D, then the payoffs are (4, 0). If player 1 chooses U, then the payoffs are (3, 3). 

Suppose three players, 1, 2 and 3, use the following procedure to allocate 9 indivisible coins. Player 1 proposes an allocation (x1, x2, x3) where xi is the number of coins given to player i. Players 2 and 3 vote on the proposal, saying either Y (Yes) or N (No). If there are two Y votes, then the proposed allocation is implemented. If there are two N votes, the proposal is rejected. If there is one Y vote  and one N vote, then player 1 gets to vote Y or N. Now, the proposal is accepted if there are two Y votes and rejected if there are two N votes.
If 1’s proposal is rejected, then 2 makes a proposal. Now, only 3 votes Y or N. If 3 votes Y, then 2’s proposal is accepted. If 3 votes N, then the proposal is rejected and the allocation (3, 3, 3) is  implemented.
Assume that, if the expected allocation to be received by a particular player by voting Y or N is identical, then the player votes N.

If 1’s proposal is rejected and 2 gets to make a proposal, her proposal will be

Consider the game

U          x, x          z, y

D          y, z          y, y

where the row player's payoff is given first, followed by the column player's payoff. This game has only one Nash equilibrium when

Suppose three players, 1, 2 and 3, use the following procedure to allocate 9 indivisible coins. Player 1 proposes an allocation (x1, x2, x3) where xi is the number of coins given to player i. Players 2 and 3 vote on the proposal, saying either Y (Yes) or N (No). If there are two Y votes, then the proposed allocation is implemented. If there are two N votes, the proposal is rejected. If there is one Y vote  and one N vote, then player 1 gets to vote Y or N. Now, the proposal is accepted if there are two Y votes and rejected if there are two N votes.
If 1’s proposal is rejected, then 2 makes a proposal. Now, only 3 votes Y or N. If 3 votes Y, then 2’s proposal is accepted. If 3 votes N, then the proposal is rejected and the allocation (3, 3, 3) is  implemented.
Assume that, if the expected allocation to be received by a particular player by voting Y or N is identical, then the player votes N.

1’s proposal will be